MOBILIZATION

In March, 1948, at a specially convened moatza (national council) in Cleveland, a state of emergency in Habonim was declared and a call for the mobilization (giyus) of the movement was issued. No other single period or activity so affected us as this giyus. The turbulent months following the United Nations partition decision were anxious months of waiting for direction and difficult months of executing this giyus.

Overnight, the jubilant celebrations of November 29, 1947, had turned into the sober realization that the Jewish state would have to be established in battle. The cost of the battle, the immensity of the task, and the knowledge that this was a total war, with the entire Zionist effort at stake, aroused our chaverim. How could we participate most effectively in this struggle? Could we be content with "business as usual"? Were our regular channels of chalutz education sufficient? Did not a movement which recognized Eretz Israel as the force by which the Jewish people would survive or fall, did not such a movement have to react vigorously, utilizing extraordinary methods? In that terrible moment, when the question at hand was survival or destruction, a movement which educated its chaverim to feel personally responsible for the creation and defense of Eretz Israel could only consider a course of action paralleling that which the Jewish community of Palestine had chosen.

This sense of urgency penetrated wider and wider circles and aroused elements once far removed from the Zionist struggle. In the discussions and plans for a broad call to action to American Jewish youth, our movement prepared itself for an active and leading role. Certainly it was our responsibility to be wherever any general action on behalf of Eretz Israel was being organized.

A program began to evolve based on the emergency needs of Eretz Israel. In this light, the Cleveland moatza met and prepared the groundwork for the Habonim mobilization, the giyus. Every section of the country echoed variations of the same powerful theme. Of course, it must be remembered that for the most part these were our leading chaverim, who felt the need most keenly and who were most prepared to respond.
This was the program of giyus adopted at Cleveland in March, 1948:

Recognizing that the Jewish people are at war, recognizing that our enemies are bent on the destruction of the achievements of the past fifty years of constructive Zionist effort, recognizing that in the last analysis our own strength will be the decisive factor, the national council of Habonim declares a state of emergency in Habonim in order to effectively mobilize the manpower of Habonim for the service of the Jewish people.

We call upon all chaverim over eighteen years old to submit to the discipline of a national vaad giyus (mobilization committee) to be (set up by Habonim in accordance with the following program: 

1. We call on all Habonim members of Hechalutz to be prepared for immediate hachshara or aliya, individual cases to be brought to the vaad giyus for personal consideration.
2. Our primary interest remains the continued, increased, and accelerated organized aliya of chalutzim through garinim. 3. We call upon all chaverim who have not decided to join Hechalutz to participate in a limited service corps for Eretz Israel.
4. It is understood that throughout this state of emergency a certain number of chaverim will be retained to continue the important organizational and educational work of the movement in recruiting additional chaverim. Chaverim for this work will be chosen by the vaad giyus and the institutions of Habonim. The vaad giyus will also choose chaverim for other special projects.

We feel confident that our movement, which has always been in the forefront of those who realize their ideals in their own personal lives, will respond to this call in the tradition of chalutzim the world over.

Chaverim had serious reservations and doubts. Our best contribution to the war effort still remained the organized aliya of trained chalutzim. Our mission extended beyond the war in Israel. Would not this giyus, wider in scope, detract from this central role of Habonim? We were a "chalutz-centered" movement. Would not this giyus alienate considerable numbers not yet chalutzim And, in doing so, would it not affect the entire approach and nature of Habonim?

As an educational youth movement, we concerned ourselves with the individual, his development, needs, and personality; we attempted to rear well-rounded, self-sufficient individuals, capable of making decisions. In the highest tradition of freedom we taught him to discover for himself one particular form of expression for his hagshama atzmit (self-realization). In speeding up ally a and hachshara, would we still be true to these purposes? To carry this project out properly meant using highly selected personnel who would have adequate means at their disposal. Did we have such personnel for the vaadot giyus, for our hachshara farms, and for the guidance and orientation so necessary once these chaverim arrived in Israel?

Those who were entrusted with carrying out the mobilization program were no less aware of the obstacles to be overcome and of the many-sided implications than the sharpest critics. But the forces which had impelled the moatza, with solemn and calm determination, to support overwhelmingly this mobilization were clear. And, in the first weeks which followed the moatza, the newspaper accounts of mounting death tolls and larger military actions in Israel fortified the conviction that, as a movement professing belief in a code of personal identification with Eretz Israel, we were being true to the tradition and character of our movement.

We had to come with this call to each individual. Garin Aleph had to compromise its elaborate plans for extensive training and procurement of equipment. In the same moment that the movement proclaimed its mobilization, a new garin was called into being. This was not merely coincidence but an emphatic statement of the primary nature of our effort. The hazard of immature and inadequately prepared persons finding their way into the various phases of giyus had to be risked. Only by concentrating our best guidance in the selection and direction of chaverim could this danger be reduced to a minimum and the inevitable youthfulness of the major number of those responding receive the constant help and direction so necessary.

Selected -madrichim and shlichim toured the country interviewing all chaverim seventeen years old and over, non-members of Hechalutz as well as members. In the course of two months, approximately six hundred chaverim were interviewed. Eighty chaverim of Garin Aleph, fifteen chaverim of the Los Angeles-Montreal aliya group, and one hundred and five other chaverim left on aliya individually or in small groups. Thirty chaverim who volunteered for a limited service group could not be utilized. Ninety chaverim went on hachshara. Thirty-five chaverim agreed to undertake assignments in movement work. In summary, an aliya of two hundred left in nine months. Sixty percent of the chaverim interviewed responded to the giyus in one way or another. The forty percent who did not actively participate consisted of chaverim relatively new to the movement, of chaverim unable to participate because of personal difficulties, and of a small group simply indifferent or too involved in school.

The main chapters were written by those who went on aliyah to join the settlements and the fighting forces of Israel. Scattere( throughout the army were Habonim chaverim, some of them riflemen and sappers, and others in high technical and administrative posts.

That aspect of the giyus which was to be channelized into the general stream of "service for the duration" proved to be the weakest phase of our effort. Many of our chaverim who either were no chalutzim or were not yet prepared for aliya were nevertheless anxious to participate in whatever capacity necessary for the emergency period. Unfortunately, the apparatus established to handle this genera service group was beset with organizational, political, and legal complications which greatly reduced its efficiency and resulted in a very limited field of work. Many of our people were thus prevented from joining the common effort. This had its ill effects on the giyus program There were other mistakes and errors, too, but none of these defect detracted in the least from the correctness of the decision to place the movement under mobilization or from the results of this action.

D.B., 1960