More Peulot

This section has more peulot to refer to in order to help madrichim in educating the chanichim. It also includes a brainstormed list of peulot that madrichim can use to teach about Israel.

Younger Chanichim

· Nationalism: need for a Jewish state, aliyah bet, comparison to the current US situation (why is flag raising a response?), have kids make their own flag, how do you feel you’re American/Canadian?, Olympics/national pride, how many countries can you think of?/how many are there in the world?, what makes a nationality distinct?, what makes a person an Arab/Jew/Mizrachi/Ashkenazi/Sefardi; what makes Saudis different than Egyptians than Turks?

· Geography: comparative maps, geography in the eye of the beholder, what do maps tell us about ourselves?, map comparison of different territorial conflicts, capture the flag based games, life-sized RISK, giant map (kikar-sized) with stations inside, addressing the middle east as a whole, water distribution peulah, create map culture

· Religion: examining Jewish ritual – separation of sacred space, how does religion connect to physical space? (mindfucks?), comparing core positive tenets of different religions, getting kids involved in rituals (esp. shabbos), reading torah – whatzat mean?, incorporating religious icons…collage?

Older Chanichim

Goal: The Chanich will be able to explain the necessity of Israel to ensure the physical survival of the Jewish people.

Method:Fun, noisy game of tag. The kids are split into two teams, and then the rules are read.

1. When someone is touched, s/he is immediately out of the game, and s/he lies down in place.

2. Whoever is given a circle of paper to wear on their forehead must wear it, and may not hide it or take it off in the middle of the game.

3. If you choose to tag a person who has a circle of paper on their forehead, the tagger, and not the tagged, is out.

4. The game ends either when no more people can tag, or when no one else wants to tag.

For the first round, give little paper circles to all the members of one team. Allow the teams to discuss strategy for a few minutes before the start of the round. In play, the team with circles on their heads will realize that they have nothing to lose, and they will quickly tag out the other team. Replay similar rounds a few times.

For the final round, give paper circles to all players on both sides. Again, reiterate that tagging a person with a paper circle will cause you, the tagger, to be out. Don’t forget to give the kids time to plan strategy again for this crucial round. The result of this round will be: No one tags anyone else, and no one is out. Declare: in the last round, both teams won, and neither team lost!

Ask a chanich to explain the chart as if the Nazis and Jews of WWII, and the Arabs today and Israel, are tag teams with and without paper circles. (Nazis have circles, Jews in WWII do not; Both Arabs and Jews today have circles.) Bring out the point that as unpleasant as it may be, the Jews must be able to defend themselves, so that just like in the game of tag with paper circles, others will not feel that they risk nothing by trying to destroy us.

Sikkum: Ask the question: What is the only country whose army’s job is to defend the Jewish people? . . . Now, in order not to leave kids with the idea that Israel exists solely for self-defense, put up an empty sheet of paper, and come up with a list of all sorts of good things about Israel. Hold up a sign with the definition of Zionism: Zionism is the ideal that the maintenance of a Jewish state, with a Jewish culture, is the most effective option for the survival of the Jewish people. Mention that Zionism is one of the pillars of our movement.

Materials: Paper circles (1 per chanich), prepared chart and marker to fill it in, another blank sheet for the list at the end.

Goal: to inform and discuss with the kids about the “various points of view” of “the American Jewish community” which they will encounter.

Trigger: “I spy.” (one person leaves and everyone decides on an object which they see. When that person returns they try to guess the object which they have decided on by asking the group to describe the object.) The last thing they see will be “the American Jewish community.” Creativity is essential here (15 minutes).

Method: Everyone will be split into four. Each will be given a blurb about their section of “the American Jewish community”. They then must come up with a symbol and sign for their perspective (maybe a name too) and short skit (2 minutes) or cheer to explain themselves to everyone else. (30 minutes) They present. (15 minutes)

2.) Which of these perspectives do you feel most represents the larger American Jewish community?

4.) What role should the American Jewish community play in relations with Israel?

*note: Jewish and Zionist may be substituted for each other anywhere you please.

A two state solutions and negotiations with the Palestinian leadership are the pay to achieve this.

Are concerned with violence towards Palestinian and Israeli civilians and believe the future of Israel is dependant on peace with a Palestinian state and Israel’s other Arab neighbors.

Hope for a peaceful two-state solution, but not with Arafat and not at the expense of Israel’s security.

Think Sharon was right to use all military power possible to crush the Palestinians.

Will accept Palestinians there but under Israeli rule. Hates Arafat and PA and won’t negotiate, only will use force.

Peula: Settlements and Terrorism

Goal: To discuss two different obstacles to peace both of which Habonim Dror is opposed to. Avoid moral equivalency of the two issues.

Trigger: guided meditation about how the occupied territories became such. (5 min)

… Once upon a time in 1967, there was a big war in the Middle East. Egypt and Jordan and Syria and Lebanon all attacked Israel. Israel fought back. It was a bad war for everyone involved from the nation-state to the people. By the end of the war, Israel had conquered large chunks of land, called the West Bank, Gaza Strip, the Sinai Peninsula and the Golan Heights. For many significant reasons, Israel was very happy, they had protected their national security and regained control of Jerusalem. The West Bank is especially important to Jews who believe in the Bible as there are many biblical sites in the area. The West Bank is also called Yehuda v’Shomoron. Can you say Yehuda v’Shomron?

In 1976 Israel made a peace treaty with Egypt and gave the Sinai peninsula back to them.

The thing with the West Bank and Gaza is that Israel did not know what to do with all the Arab/Palestinians living there, so they decided to occupy this territory. Through an occupation they made it so this land was apart of Israel, but the people were not citizens. In fact the Palestinians had very little rights indeed. That is why this area of land is also called the occupied territories which is shtachim in Hebrew. Can you say shtachim? Right after Israel conquered the West Bank, the government helped to establish settlements all over the West Bank and Gaza strip, even though the United Nations said not to. And now there are lots and lots of settlements and settlers in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. The End.

1. Break participants into 3-4 groups. Hand out information sheets on specific settlements in WB/G. Some of my favorites are, Kiryat Arba, Maale Adumim, and Gush Katif in Gaza. Information can be pulled directly off the internet : www.yeshalinks.org.il. Have each group do a ‘commercial’ for their settlement. (20 min)

Trigger: watch the Israeli Foreign Ministry video on terrorist incitement. (10 min)

Method: The participants should be divided into five groups. Three of the groups are given information on a different terrorist organization (Islamic Jihad, Hamas, PFLP) and should prepare a ‘recruitment leaflet’ focusing on their group’s ideology. Two of the groups will receive articles on the ‘psychology of terrorists’ and should prepare a ‘recruitment leaflet’ focusing on the groups ‘target audience’. (20 min)

Sikkum: divide into more intimate groups each with a madrich to facilitate the discussion:

· Why do Israel and the Palestinians support things (either formally or informally) that are obstacles to peace?

· HDNA always distanced itself from terrorism (pre state we were opposed to the Jewish terrorist underground LEHI on ideological grounds). What about settlements?

What Makes Suicide Bombers Tick by: Elie Shuman

What brings a young Palestinian man to detonate himself amidst a crowd of teenagers? Is it a religious upbringing with promises of paradise in reward for acts of martyrdom? Is it the parental support he receives for his convictions? Is it brainwashing, or rather encouragement from a Palestinian society with no other means of fighting back against oppression and humiliation?

Yesterday the military wing of the Hamas, Izz al-Din al-Qassam, claimed responsibility for Friday night's bombing outside a Tel Aviv discotheque, which took the lives of 20 young Israelis. The suicide bomber was identified as 22-year-old Saeed Hotary, a Jordanian who had been living in Kalkilya.

"I am very happy and proud of what my son did and I hope all the men of Palestine and Jordan would do the same,'' Saeed's father Hassan told The Associated Press.

Family members could not supply information about Saeed's political affiliations. His brother said Saeed "was very religious since he was young; he prayed and fasted."

The typical suicide bomber
Since the signing of the Oslo Agreements in 1993, Palestinian terrorist organizations have sent more than 70 suicide bombers on missions against Israeli targets. Fortunately, not all succeeded in their missions like Hotary. Last month Yediot Aharonot presented a profile of the typical suicide bomber:

	47% of the suicide bombers have an academic education and an additional 29% have at least a high school education.
	83% of the suicide bombers are single.
	64% of the suicide bombers are between the ages 18-23; most of the rest are under 30.
	68% of the suicide bombers have come from the Gaza Strip.

In a column published today in the New York Times, William Safire writes that "the pride and joy of Arafat's arsenal is a weapon of mass terror that has no known defense: the human missile." Safire describes the suicide bombers as being 'brainwashed' and considers the efforts necessary to enable the launching of these 'missiles.'

"[Arafat] knows where the human missiles are being programmed and armed. Such fanatic indoctrination takes time and isolation; it takes teachers of terror skilled in evoking visions of a martyrdom and requires recruits from vulnerably infuriated families who are known to other cells. The brainwashing is reinforced with official broadcasts of films of a dead boy beckoning potential suicide killers to join him in paradise."
From the New York Times, June 4, 2001

In a report on MSNBC following the suicide bombing attack in Netanya last month, unnamed sources from Hamas admitted that suicide bombers undergo a process of indoctrination that lasts for months.

"The bombers believe they are sent on their missions by God, and by the time they're ready to be strapped with explosives, say the sources, they have reached a hypnotic state. Their rationale: that by blowing themselves up in a crowd of Israelis, they are forging their own gateway to heaven."
From MSNBC

The BBC reported that suicide bombers "are likely to be motivated by religious fervor." According to a BBC report, recruits are "picked out from mosques, schools and religious institutions. They are likely to have shown particular dedication to the principles of Islam… and are taught the rewards that will await them if they sacrifice their lives."

Islam reserves places in paradise
According to Islamic tradition, "he who gives his life for an Islamic cause will have his sins forgiven and a place reserved in paradise."

But Christine Huda Dodge, Abot's Guide to Islam, insists that suicide is forbidden in Islam. Though "fighting oppression is commendable," Dodge points out that "harming innocent bystanders, even in times of war, was forbidden by the Prophet Muhammad."

Sheik Abdul Aziz bin Abdullah al Sheik, the supreme religious leader of Saudi Arabia, issued a fatwa (religious edict) in April that equated suicide bombings with suicide, which therefore is not allowed in Islam.

In response, Mohammed Sayed Tantawi, a leading doctrinal authority in the Sunni Muslim world, wrote in Egypt's Al Ahram that "if a person blows himself up, as in operations that Palestinian youths carry out against those they are fighting, then he is a martyr. But if he explodes himself among babies or women or old people who are not fighting the war, then he is not considered a martyr."

The bottom line is not entirely clear among Islamic clerics. Sheik Yousef al Qaradawi, a moderate Egyptian cleric told the Qatari newspaper Al Raya in April, "They are not suicide operations. These are heroic martyrdom operations, and the heroes who carry them out don't embark on this action out of hopelessness and despair but are driven by an overwhelming desire to cast terror and fear into the hearts of the oppressors."

Combination of occupation and humiliation
Mouin Rabbani, director of the Palestinian American Research Center in Ramallah, claims, "Religious or ideological fervor appears to offer only a partial explanation." Rabbani says "Palestinian suicide bombers are neither products of a passive and unquestioning obedience to political authority nor pressed into service against their will."

Instead, Rabbani states that the common thread among all suicide bombers is the "bitter experience of what they see as Israeli state terror."

"Without exception, the suicide bombers have lived their lives on the receiving end of a system designed to trample their rights and crush every hope of a brighter future… Confronted by a seemingly endless combination of death, destruction, restriction, harassment and humiliation, they conclude that ending life as a bomb - rather than having it ended by a bullet - endows them, even if only in their final moments, with a semblance of purpose and control previously considered out of reach."
From Middle East News Online

Palestinians support suicide bombings
An unnamed Palestinian security official cited in today's Jerusalem Post said, "One of the problems in stopping [suicide bombing] attacks is the strong support for them among the population."

According to a poll conducted among Palestinian adults from the Gaza Strip and the West Bank including East Jerusalem at the end of May by Dr. Nabil Kukali and the Palestinian Center for Public Opinion (PCPO), "a substantial majority (76.1%) support suicidal attacks like that of Netanya [in May], whereas 12.5% oppose, and 11.4% express no opinion."

Palestinian psychiatrist Iyad Al-Sarraj, cited in a recent Reuters report entitled "Palestinians find ready supply of suicide bombers," said both religion and the humiliation of life under occupation were the key motives for suicide bombers bent on starting a better life in paradise.

"It is no wonder that some people are doing it. We should wonder why everyone isn't doing it," Sarraj said.

Rational Fanatics

(This article was originally published in the September/October 2000 issue of Foreign Policy.) By Ehud Sprinzak

October 23, 1983, was one of the most horrific days in the history of modern terrorism. Two massive explosions destroyed the barracks of the U.S. and French contingents of the multinational peacekeeping force in Beirut, Lebanon, killing 241 American servicemen and 58 French paratroopers. Both explosions were carried out by Muslim extremists who drove to the heart of the target area and detonated bombs with no intention of escaping. Subsequent suicide attacks against Israeli and U.S. targets in Lebanon and Kuwait made it clear that a new type of killing had entered the repertoire of modern terrorism: a suicide operation in which the success of the attack depends on the death of the perpetrator.

This tactic stunned security experts. Two centuries of experience suggested that terrorists, though ready to risk their lives, wished to live after the terrorist act in order to benefit from its accomplishments. But this new terrorism defied that belief. It seemed qualitatively different, appearing almost supernatural, extremely lethal, and impossible to stop. Within six months, French and U.S. Presidents François Mitterrand and Ronald Reagan pulled their troops out of Lebanon-a tacit admission that the new terrorism rendered all known counter terrorist measures useless. Government officials erected concrete barriers around the White House and sealed the Pentagon's underground bus tunnels. Nobody was reassured. As Time magazine skeptically observed in 1983: "No security expert thinks such defensive measures will stop a determined Islamic terrorist who expects to join Allah by killing some Americans."

Whereas the press lost no time in labeling these bombers irrational zealots, terrorism specialists offered a more nuanced appraisal, arguing that suicide terrorism has inherent tactical advantages over "conventional" terrorism: It is a simple and low-cost operation (requiring no escape routes or complicated rescue operations); it guarantees mass casualties and extensive damage (since the suicide bomber can choose the exact time, location, and circumstances of the attack); there is no fear that interrogated terrorists will surrender important information (because their deaths are certain); and it has an immense impact on the public and the media (due to the overwhelming sense of helplessness). Dr. Ramadan Shalah, secretary- general of the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, summarized the chilling logic of the new terror tactic: "Our enemy possesses the most sophisticated weapons in the world and its army is trained to a very high standard. . . . We have nothing with which to repel killing and thuggery against us except the weapon of martyrdom. It is easy and costs us only our lives. . . human bombs cannot be defeated, not even by nuclear bombs."

The prevalence of suicide terrorism during the last two decades testifies to its gruesome effectiveness [see table on opposite page]. It has formed a vital part of several terror campaigns, including Hezbollah's successful operation against the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in the mid-1980s, the 1994-96 Hamas bus bombings aimed at stopping the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, and the 1995-99 Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) struggle against Turkey. The formation of special suicide units within the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) army in Sri Lanka has added an atrocious dimension to the civil war on that devastated island. In addition to killing hundreds of civilians, soldiers, and high-ranking officers since 1987, LTTE suicide terrorists have assassinated two heads of state: Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi of India in 1991 and President Ranasinghe Premadasa of Sri Lanka in 1993. Sri Lanka's current president, Chandrika Kumaratunga, recently lost sight in one eye following an assassination attempt that killed at least 24 people. The simultaneous 1998 bombings of the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, which took the lives of nearly 300 civilians, were a brutal reprise of the 1983 tragedies in Lebanon.

Almost 20 years after its stunning modern debut, suicide terrorism continues to carry the image of the "ultimate" terror weapon. But is this tactic as unstoppable as it seems? The experiences of the last two decades have yielded important insights into the true nature of suicide bombers-insights that demystify their motivations and strategies, expose their vulnerabilities, and suggest ways to defeat what a senior State Department official once called a "frightening" problem to which there are "no answers."

Average, Everyday Martyrs
A long view of history reveals that suicide terrorism existed many years before "truck bombs" became part of the global vernacular. As early as the 11th century, the Assassins, Muslim fighters living in northern Persia, adopted suicide terrorism as a strategy to advance the cause of Islam. In the 18th century the Muslim communities of the Malabar Coast in India, Atjeh in Sumatra, and Mindanao and Sulu in the southern Philippines resorted to suicide attacks when faced with European colonial repression. These perpetrators never perceived their deaths as suicide. Rather, they saw them as acts of martyrdom in the name of the community and for the glory of God.

Moreover, suicide terrorism, both ancient and modern, is not merely the product of religious fervor, Islamic or otherwise. Martha Crenshaw, a leading terrorism scholar at Wesleyan University, argues that the mind-set of a suicide bomber is no different from those of Tibetan self-immolators, Irish political prisoners ready to die in a hunger strike, or dedicated terrorists worldwide who wish to live after an operation but know their chances of survival are negligible. Seen in this light, suicide terrorism loses its demonic uniqueness. It is merely one type of martyrdom venerated by certain cultures or religious traditions but rejected by others who favor different modes of supreme sacrifice.

Acts of martyrdom vary not only by culture, but also by specific circumstances. Tel Aviv University psychologist Ariel Merari has conducted the most comprehensive study of individuals who commit acts of suicide terrorism. After profiling more than 50 Muslim suicide bombers serving in Hezbollah, Amal, and secular pro-Syrian organizations in Lebanon, as well as Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad in Israel, he concluded that there is no single psychological or demographic profile of suicide terrorists. His findings suggest that intense struggles produce several types of people with the potential willingness to sacrifice themselves for a cause [see sidebar on page 70]. Furthermore, Merari maintains that no organization can create a person's basic readiness to die. The task of recruiters is not to produce but rather to identify this predisposition in candidates and reinforce it. Recruiters will often exploit religious beliefs when indoctrinating would-be bombers, using their subjects' faith in a reward in paradise to strengthen and solidify preexisting sacrificial motives. But other powerful motives reinforce tendencies toward martyrdom, including patriotism, hatred of the enemy, and a profound sense of victimization.

Since suicide terrorism is an organizational phenomenon, the struggle against it cannot be conducted on an individual level. Although profiling suicide bombers may be a fascinating academic challenge, it is less relevant in the real-world struggle against them than understanding the modus operandi and mind-set of terrorist leaders who would never consider killing themselves, but opt for suicide terrorism as a result of cold reasoning.

The Care and Feeding of a Suicide Bomber
A suicide terrorist is almost always the last link in a long organizational chain that involves numerous actors. Once the decision to launch a suicide attack has been made, its implementation requires at least six separate operations: target selection, intelligence gathering, recruitment, physical and "spiritual" training, preparation of explosives, and transportation of the suicide bombers to the target area. Such a mission often involves dozens of terrorists and accomplices who have no intention of committing suicide, but without whom no suicide operation could take place.

A careful survey of all the organizations that have resorted to suicide terrorism since 1983 suggests that the most meaningful distinction among them involves the degree to which suicide bombing is institutionalized. At the simplest level are groups that neither practice suicide terrorism on a regular basis nor approve of its use as a tactic. Local members or affiliates of such organizations, however, may initiate it on their own for a variety of reasons, such as imitating the glorious acts of others, responding to a perception of enormous humiliation and distress, avenging the murder of comrades and relatives, or being presented with a special opportunity to strike.

Within such a context, it is important to take into account what might be called "pre-suicide terrorism." Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad suicide operations in Israel during the 1990s were preceded by a wave of knifings in the late 1980s. These attackers never planned an escape route and were often killed on the spot. The knifings did not involve any known organization and were mostly spontaneous. But they expressed a collective mood among young Palestinians of jihad (holy war) against Israel that helped create an atmosphere for the institutionalized suicide terrorism of the next decade.

Many terrorist groups are skeptical of suicide terrorism's strategic value but resort to this tactic in exceptional circumstances. Within this category are the bombings of the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania (allegedly executed by Osama bin Laden's Qaida organization) and similar irregular attacks conducted over the years by the Egyptian Islamic Group, the Egyptian Islamic Jihad, the Kuwaiti Dawa, and the Algerian Armed Islamic Group, among others. Such suicide bombings, though carefully planned, are irregular and unsystematic.

At another level are groups that formally adopt suicide terrorism as a temporary strategy. The leaders of these movements obtain (or grant) ideological or theological legitimization for its use, recruit and train volunteers, and then send them into action with a specific objective in mind. The most spectacular operations of Hezbollah between 1983 and 1985, of Hamas between 1994 and 1996, and of the PKK between 1995 and 1999 fall within this category. More recently, Chechen rebels suddenly launched a campaign of suicide bombings following nine months of inconclusive fighting against the Russian military; one of the first bombers, a cousin of noted rebel leader Arbi Barayev, had reportedly declared: "I am going willingly to my death in the name of Allah and the freedom of the Chechen people."

In such cases, the institutionalization of suicide terrorism has been temporary and conditional. Leaders who opt for this type of terrorism are usually moved by an intense sense of crisis, a conviction in the effectiveness of this new tactic, endorsement by the religious or ideological establishment, and the enthusiastic support of their community. At the same time, they are fully aware of the changeable nature of these conditions and of the potential costs associated with suicide terrorism (such as devastating military retaliation). They consequently have little difficulty in suspending suicide bombing or calling it off entirely.

A case in point is Hezbollah's decision to begin suicide bombings in 1983. It is known today that several leaders of the organization were extremely uneasy about the practice. Insisting that Islam does not approve of believers taking their own lives, clerics such as Sheikh Fadlallah raised legal objections and were unwilling to allow the use of this new tactic. However, suicide terrorism became so effective in driving foreigners out of Lebanon that there was no motivation to stop it. The result was theological hair splitting that characterized suicide bombers as exceptional soldiers who risked their lives in a holy war. But following the Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon in 1985 and the decreasing effectiveness of this tactic, Hezbollah's clerics ordered the end of systematic suicide bombing. The organization's fighters were instructed to protect their lives and continue the struggle against the Zionists through conventional guerrilla methods. Only rarely, and on an irregular basis, has Hezbollah allowed suicide bombing since.

It is not exactly clear when the commanders of Hamas decided to turn their anti-Israel suicide attacks into a strategic struggle against the peace process. Their campaign, started haphazardly in 1992 against Israeli military and settler targets in the occupied territories, failed to produce glaring results. The 1994 Hebron Massacre, when Israeli doctor Baruch Goldstein murdered 29 praying Palestinians, changed everything. Determined to avenge the deaths of their countrymen, Hamas operators resorted to suicide bus bombings inside Israeli cities. In a matter of weeks, the new wave of terrorism had eroded Israel's collective confidence in the peace process and had played right into the hands of extremist Hamas clerics who opposed negotiations with Israel. Yet, in 1995 these attacks suddenly came to a complete halt. Several factors convinced Hamas leaders to back off: the growing Palestinian resentment against the costs of the bus bombings (expressed in massive Israeli economic sanctions), the increasing cooperation between Israeli and Palestinian security services, and the effectiveness of Israeli counterterrorism.

Ironically, Israel unintentionally pushed the organization to resume the bus bombings when, in 1996, then Prime Minister Shimon Peres ordered the assassination of Yehiya Ayash (known as "the Engineer") -a Hamas operative who masterminded many of the previous suicide bombings. Humiliated and angered, Hamas temporarily resumed bus bombings in Israel. A series of three successful attacks by Hamas and one by the Palestinian Islamic Jihad changed Israel's political mood about the peace process and led to the 1996 electoral defeat of Peres and his pro-peace government.

In the cases of Hezbollah and Hamas, no permanent suicide units were formed, and bombers were recruited and trained on an ad hoc, conditional basis. But, in rare instances, some organizations adopt suicide terrorism as a legitimate and permanent strategy, harkening back to the Japanese kamikaze pilots of the Second World War.

Currently, the Sri Lankan Tamil Tigers are the only example of this phenomenon. The "Black Tigers" launched their first attack in July 1987, and since then suicide bombings have become an enduring feature of the LTTE's ruthless struggle. During the last 13 years, 171 attacks have killed hundreds of civilians and soldiers and wounded thousands more. The assassinations of two heads of state, political leaders, and high-ranking military officers have made it clear that no politician or public figure is immune to these attacks.

The Black Tigers constitute the most significant proof that suicide terrorism is not merely a religious phenomenon and that under certain extreme political and psychological circumstances secular volunteers are fully capable of martyrdom. The Tamil suicide bombers are not the product of a religious cult, but rather a cult of personality: Velupillai Prabhakaran, the brutal and charismatic LTTE leader who initiated the practice, appears to have been greatly influenced by the spectacular successes of Hezbollah in Lebanon. Fiercely determined to fight the repressive Sinhalese government until the Tamils achieve independence, Prabhakaran created the suicide units largely by the strength of his personality and his unlimited control of the organization.

The formation of the Black Tigers was greatly facilitated by an early practice of the organization's members: Since the early 1980s, all LTTE fighters-male and female alike-have been required to carry potassium cyanide capsules. A standard LTTE order makes it unequivocally clear that soldiers are to consume the capsule's contents if capture is imminent. The LTTE suicide units are essentially an extension of the organization's general culture of supreme martyrdom; the passage from ordinary combat soldier to suicide bomber is a short and tragic journey.

Making Suicide Terrorists Pay
The perceived strength of suicide bombers is that they are lone, irrational fanatics who cannot be deterred. The actual weakness of suicide bombers is that they are nothing more than the instruments of terrorist leaders who expect their organizations to gain tangible benefits from this shocking tactic. The key to countering suicide bombers, therefore, is to make terrorist organizations aware that this decision will incur painful costs. While no simple formula for countering suicide terrorism exists, the experiences of the last two decades suggest two complementary political and operational strategies.

Organizations only implement suicide terrorism systematically if their community (and, in some cases, a foreign client state) approves of its use. Thus, political and economic sanctions against the terrorists' community, combined with effective coercive diplomacy against their foreign patrons, may help reduce or end suicide terrorism. The problem with political counterterrorism, however, is that it takes a long time to implement and the results are never certain. The Taliban in Afghanistan, for instance, continue to host Osama bin Laden (who was indicted by the United States in November 1998 for the bombings of the two U.S. embassies in East Africa) despite international sanctions, a unanimously adopted United Nations Security Council Resolution demanding that he stand trial, and a threat from the United States that the Taliban will be held responsible for any terrorist acts undertaken while Bin Laden is under their protection.

The leaders of organizations that resort to suicide terrorism are evidently ready to take great risks. Consequently, the political battle against suicide bombers must always be enhanced by an aggressive operational campaign. Governments do not have to invent entirely new tactics when waging a war against suicide terrorists. Instead, they must adapt and intensify existing counterterrorism strategies to exploit the vulnerabilities of suicide bombers.

The Achilles' heel of suicide terrorists is that they are part of a large, operational infrastructure. It may not be possible to profile and apprehend would-be suicide bombers, but once it has been established that an organization has resolved to use suicide terrorism, security services can strike against the commanders and field officers who recruit and train the assailants and then plan the attacks. This counterterrorism effort calls for the formation of effective networks of informers, the constant monitoring of potential collaborators, and close cooperation among international intelligence services. Counterterrorist operatives must apply consistent pressure on the terrorist infrastructure through harassment and attacks. They must also seek ways to cut off the terrorists' sources of funding by depriving organizations of their financial resources (such as international bank accounts or "front" businesses). Regardless of the presence or absence of hard evidence for planned operations, it is essential to put potential terrorists on the run.

The physical protection of potential target areas is another essential tactic. The idea of erecting concrete barriers against a martyr driving a truck loaded with tons of explosives might strike some as ludicrously inadequate. But such physical protection serves two essential objectives: It reduces the effect of the suicide bombing if and when the terrorist hits the target area, and it serves as a deterrent against potential suicide strikes. For the terrorist field officers, who may never know when they will be caught or killed, each suicide squad is precious. When faced with highly protected areas, they are unlikely to send squads into action. Roadblocks, guards at special checkpoints, inspection teams in public places, and the use of dogs and artificial sniffing devices may drive suicide terrorism down significantly.

Such security measures also reassure the public. Governments must never forget that terrorism constitutes a form of psychological warfare, and that suicide terrorism is the ultimate expression of this struggle. Terrorism must always be fought psychologically-a battle that often takes place in the minds of ordinary people. Even if governments do not have an immediate operational solution to suicide terrorism, they must convince their citizens that they are not sitting ducks and that the authorities are doing everything they can to protect them. Ordinary people should, in fact, be informed that psychological warfare is being waged against them. Free people who are told that they are being subjected to psychological manipulation are likely to develop strong terrorism antibodies.

In fighting suicide bombers, it is important not to succumb to the idea that they are ready to do anything and lose everything. This is the same sort of simplistic reasoning that has fueled the widespread hysteria over terrorists acquiring weapons of mass destruction (WMD). The perception that terrorists are undeterrable fanatics who are willing to kill millions indiscriminately just to sow fear and chaos belies the reality that they are cold, rational killers who employ violence to achieve specific political objectives. Whereas the threat of WMD terrorism is little more than overheated rhetoric, suicide bombing remains a devastating form of terrorism whose complete demise is unlikely in the 21st century. The ongoing political instability in the Middle East, Russia, and South Asia-including Iran, Afghanistan, Chechnya, and possibly India and Pakistan-suggests that these regions will continue to be high-risk areas, with irregular suicide bombings occasionally extending to other parts of the globe. But the present understanding of the high costs of suicide terrorism and the growing cooperation among intelligence services worldwide gives credence to the hope that in the future only desperate organizations of losers will try to use this tactic on a systematic basis.

Ehud Sprinzak is dean of the Lauder School of Government, Policy, and Diplomacy at the Interdisciplinary Center in Herzliya, Israel.

Name:___________

Settlement Math 101: Final Exam

Part A: Population of the West Bank and Gaza Strip

a. Around _________ (7 x 100) Palestinian towns with a total population of __________ (y + 69 = 72) million Palestinians.

b. Around ____________ ( 14+ 29+ 85-2+16) Israeli Settlements with the total population of around _______________ ( 204, 000 – 1,000) settlers.

a. approximately ________________ (age of retirement x 1000) Israeli Settlers living in _________ settlements ( or I am x going on 17, innocent as a rose).

b. Approximately ___ (uno, wahad, ehad, une, ichi) million Palestinians living in some __________________ ( number of times Josh Cohen propositioned the Merkezet Tochniot in the last day or 39 + 1) towns.

a. approximately _______________ ( rhymes with one hundred ninety-six thousand and five smundered) Israeli settlers living in about (amount of money embezzled per-chanich at Machaneh to cushion the Mazkirut’s pockets or 13 x 10) _______________ settlements.

b. Approximately ____ (dos, tnayn, shtayim, dou, ni) million Palestinians living in some ___________ (number of consecutive days Jamie wore the green pants from the dead guy or 325 x 2) towns.

1. There has been a ____.__% ( the reverse of 94.25) growth in the settlements since September 1993.

2. There has been an approximately ___% ( 22% more than 50%) growth in the settler population since the end of September 1993.

4. During the period 1993-1999, settlers established ____ (7x4)“unofficial” settlements. Only _____ (quarto, arba, arba, quatre, shi) were subsequently dismantled.

5. During the period 1994-1999, paving was begun on around ___ (number of times I’ve had to use a calculator to write this peulah, or 73 + 14) miles of Israeli bypass roads in the West Bank and Gaza. During the same period, paving was completed on around ____ (100 – 1 ) miles of Israeli bypass roads.

6. During the last quarter of 2000 ( after the outbreak of the new Intifada) work was begun on 954 new publicly-funded housing units in settlements.

* all numbers and statistics are taken from Americans for Peace Now “Fact Sheet: West Bank and Gaza Strip Settlements. May 2001.

Part D: Essay Questions

2. Why does the Israeli government and settlers keep building new settlements despite the fact that it has been labeled illegal under international law?

Islamic Jihad

The Palestinian Islamic Jihad (Harakat al-Jihad al-Islami al-Filastini) was founded in 1979-80 by Palestinian students in Egypt, who had split from the Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood in the Gaza Strip. The founders were highly influenced by the Islamic revolution in Iran on the one and hand, and the radicalization and militancy of Egyptian Islamic student organizations, on the other.

The founders - Fathi Shqaqi, `Abd al-`Aziz `Odah and Bashir Musa - were disappointed by the supposed moderation of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, and what they considered the neglect by the Egyptian Islamists of the priority that should be given to the Palestinian problem. Shqaqi and Musa, therefore, proposed a new ideological program, which became the basis for the new organization. They claimed that the unity of the Islamic world was not a precondition for the liberation of Palestine, but on the contrary, the liberation of Palestine by the Islamic movements was the key to the unification of the Arab and Islamic world. In other words: the Jihad for the liberation of Palestine by Islamic movements will bring upon the expected Jihad for the reconstruction of the greater and one Islamic state.

The admiration of the three Palestinian militants for the Islamic revolution in Iran was at that time unique of its kind in the Arab world and among the Islamic Sunni movements. Not only did they consider the Iranian revolution as a model for the Arab world, but they accepted the principle of "the leadership of the men of religion" (vilayet-i-faqih) although it was a Shi'ite concept. Shqaqi was also the first in the Arab Sunni world to write, already in March 1979, a book glorifying Khomeini and the Iranian revolution, which was banned by the Egyptian authorities.

This group of Palestinian students maintained close relations with radical Islamic Egyptian students, some of whom were involved in the assassination of president Sadat, in October 1981. As a result, the Palestinian Islamic radicals were expelled from Egypt and returned to the Gaza Strip, where they formally began their activity as an Islamic Jihad organization.

The faction was involved in subversive and terrorist activity in the Territories in the 1980s. During the year 1987, prior to the Intifada, it carried out several terrorist attacks in the Gaza Strip. In August 1988 the two faction`s leaders, Shqaqi and `Odah, were expelled to Lebanon, where Shqaqi reorganized the faction, maintaining close contacts with the Iranian Revolutionary Guards unit stationed in Lebanon and with Hizballah. Shqaqi expanded the political connections of the faction and became a prominent member of the new Rejection Front which emerged after the Israeli- Palestinian Oslo agreement, under Syrian influence.

Shqaqi was killed in October 1995 in Malta, allegedly by Israeli agents. His successor is Dr. Ramadan `Abdallah Shalah, who has resided several years in Florida, U.S.A, and moved to Damascus at the beginning of 1996. Shalah has not the charisma and the intellectual and organizational skills as Fathi Shqaqi and this has influenced the organization's position and activity.

The group has been active on the political scene in the Territories, mainly in the Gaza Strip, among students and intellectuals. Until the foundation of the Palestinian Authority in 1994, the Islamic Jihad groups did not have connections to Hamas, and were regarded even as rivals in the Gaza Strip. Since then, and mainly after Hamas switched to the strategy of suicide terrorist bombings, there was some operational cooperation between the two organizations in carrying out attacks like the one in Beit-Lid, in February 1995, or in coordinating simultaneous terrorist attacks. Shqaqi 's death undermined the PIJ's position in the Territories and Hamas no longer sees it as a threatening rival.

The group has offices in Beirut, Damascus, Tehran and Khartoum, but its activity is focused in Lebanon, where there are several tens of Palestinian members. It has some influence in the Gaza Strip, mainly in the Islamic University, but not in a way that can endanger the dominant position of Hamas as the leading Islamic Palestinian organization.

During the 1980s several other groups of Palestinian Islamic Jihad were formed, but the main faction which has survived is the group founded by Shqaqi.

Dr. Fathi Abd al-Aziz Shqaqi was born in the Gaza Strip in January 1951. Shqaqi finished B.A. studies in mathematics at Bir-Zeit University, in the West Bank and in 1974 went to Egypt to study medicine at Zaqaziq University. He became active in the ranks of the Muslim Brotherhood, but in 1974 left the organization because of ideological disputes.

Immediately after Khomeini's rise to power in 1979, Shqaqi wrote a pamphlet entitled "Khomeini: The Islamic Solution and the Alternative", in which he expressed his support for the Islamic revolution and praised Khomeini's position in regard to the unification of the two branches of Islam, the Sunna and the Shi'ia. Shqaqi's book was prohibited and he himself was arrested for three months by the Egyptian authorities.

In 1980 Shqaqi returned to Gaza and began to organize a group of young Islamic radicals, mostly students who were expelled from Egypt due to their subversive Islamic militancy.

Dr. Ramadan `Abdallah Shalah, born in the in the Saja`iyah refugee camp in Gaza Strip, was one of the first militants in the PIJ and was close to Fathi Shqaqi.

He went to study in London and was appointed head of PIJ's office there. From there he handled PIJ's military, propaganda and information activity in the Territories. Shalah finished a doctorate thesis in Islamic economics at the University of Durnham in UK.

In 1990 he went to the United States to teach Middle east courses at the South Florida University in Tampa, were he became also director of the World and Islam Studies Enterprise (WISE), a think tank on Muslim religious and political issues connected with the PIJ. After Shqaqi's killing in October 1995, `Abdallah Shalah became the head of the PIJ faction.

Sheikh `As`ad Bayyud al-Tamimi, the scion of a distinguished Hebron family, was born in 1924 and finished his law studies at the Al-Azhar University in Cairo in 1949. Tamimi began his political activity in the 1950s in the framework of the Muslim Brotherhood, but later left them because they did not accept the priority of the Palestinian problem. He was then one of the founders of the Islamic Liberation Party (Hizb al-Tahrir al-Islami), an extremist pan-Islamic organization whose base was in Jordan. He served in the 1960s as imam of al-Aqsa mosque in Jerusalem. He was expelled by Israel to Jordan in 1969 due to his radical sermons at the al-Aqsa mosque.

After the Iranian Islamic revolution, apparently with the Iranian's government blessing and in cooperation with Fatah, he began to recruit young Palestinians - including active Fatah members - for the new Islamic Jihad organization. According to him only later Shqaqi, Muhanna, and others split from the organization in 1980. In 1989 Tamimi called his faction The Islamic Jihad - al-Aqsa Battalions. Tamimi lives in Jordan.

Sheikh Tamimi wrote in 1984 a book entitled "The disappearance of Israel - a ruling of the Koran", in which he tries to prove the importance given in the Koran to Palestine and that the Jihad in Palestine is bound not only to bring back the Holy Land to Muslim sovereignty, but also to banish all presence of the infidel Jews.

Ahmad Hassan Muhanna was born in Khan Yunes and became an officer in the PLO's Palestinian Liberation Army (PLA). He was jailed in Israel for his terrorist activity and there became an extremist Islamist. He was liberated in the framework of an exchange of prisoners in 1985. He continued his terrorist activity in relation with Jaber `Ammar's faction and was expelled to Lebanon in 1988.

Sheikh Jaber `Ammar, from the Gaza Strip, was sentenced to life prison for terrorist activity at the beginning of the 1970s. He was the first to form a group of Islamic radicals inside the Israeli prison. `Ammar was released in 1983 as a result of an exchange of prisoners and went to Egypt, but he was expelled by the Egyptian authorities for his subversive activity against the regime. Later on he left for Sudan, from where he continued his terrorist and subversive activities against Israel and Egypt.

Hamas

Hamas is an acronym that stands for the Islamic Resistance Movement, a popular national resistance movement which is working to create conditions conducive to emancipating the Palestinian people, delivering them from tyranny, liberating their land from the occupying usurper, and to stand up to the Zionist scheme which is supported by neo-colonist forces.

Hamas is a Jihadi (fighting for a holy purpose) movement in the broad sense of the word Jihad. It is part of the Islamic awakening movement and upholds that this awakening is the road which will lead to the liberation of Palestine from the river to the sea. It is also a popular movement in the sense that it is a practical manifestation of a wide popular current that is deeply rooted in the ranks of the Palestinian people and the Islamic nation. It is a current which sees in the Islamic faith and doctrines a firm base in which to work against an enemy which endorses religious ideologies and plots which counter act all plans to lift up the Palestinian nation. The Hamas movement groups in its ranks all those who believe in its ideology and principles and all who are prepared to endure the consequences of the conflict and to confront the Zionist scheme.

The Hamas movement believes that the conflict with the Zionists in Palestine is a conflict of survival. It is a conflict of civilization and determination that can not be brought to an end unless its cause-the Zionist settlement in Palestine, usurpation of its land, and the displacement of its people-is removed.

Hamas sees in the Hebraic state an antagonistic totalitarian regime, not just an entity with territorial ambitions, a regime that complements the forces of modern colonialism which aim to take hold of the nation's riches and resources and to prevent the rise of any grouping that works to unify the nation's ranks. It seeks to achieve this objective by promoting provincialism, alienating the nation from its cultural roots and clamping down on its economic, political, military and even intellectual hegemony.

The Hebraic state forms an instrument that breaks the geographic continuity of the central Arab countries, and it is a device to deplete the nation's resources. It is also a spearhead which is ready to strike at any project that aims to raise the nation up.

The main confrontations with the Zionist entity is taking place in Palestine where the enemy has established its base and stronghold. But the threats and challenges posed by the Zionists run deeper and so threaten all Islamic countries. Hamas believes that the Zionist entity, since its inception, has constituted a threat to the Arab countries and also in their strategic depth, the Islamic countries. The 90s witnessed huge transformations that highlighted this danger which knows no limits.

Hamas believes that the best way to handle the conflict with the Zionist enemy is to mobilize the potentialities of the Palestinian people in the struggle against the Zionist presence in Palestine and to keep the firebrand burning until the time when the conditions to win the battle have been realized, and wait until all the potentialities and resources of the Arab and Islamic nation are mobilized under a common political will and purpose. Until that happens and there is belief in the sanctity of the
Palestinian cause and its Islamic importance and an awareness of the ultimate goals and dangers of the Zionist project in Palestine, Hamas believes that no part of Palestine should be compromised, that the Zionist occupation of Palestine should not be recognized and that it is imperative for the people of Palestine, as well as all Arabs and Muslims, to prepare themselves to fight the Zionists until they leave Palestine the way they migrated to it.

The Hebraic state represents an entity which is antagonistic to all aims of Arab and Islamic awakening. for it is known that had it not been for the state of deterioration and decadence through which the nation was passing, the Zionists would not have realized their dream of establishing their state in Palestine.

Recognizing this fact, the Zionists work against any program which they think would add to the Arab and Islamic capabilities. They believe that any attempts aiming at achieving an Arab and Islamic awakening constitute a strategic threat to Israel. The Zionists also believe that if Arab power was unified under a comprehensive program of awakening, it would pose a major threat to the Hebraic state. This conviction has prompted the Zionist leaders to transform their state from an alien entity in the Arab and Islamic surrounding to become part of it under the influence of economy. This explains why they support the (peace) settlement and promote projects with an economic orientation. It is within this context that the military action in the Hamas program should be viewed. Military action is the movement's strategic instrument for combating the Zionist element. In the absence of a comprehensive Arab and Islamic plan for liberation, military action will remain the only guarantee that would keep the conflict going and that would make it difficult for the enemy to expand outside Palestine.

In its strategic dimension, military action is the Palestinian people's main instrument to keep the firelog burning in Palestine and to counter Israeli schemes which aim at transferring the center of tension to other ports in the Arab and Islamic world.

Pursuing this approach and enforcing it up would weigh heavily on the Zionists to force them to step up their practices against the interests of our people in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.

Hamas believes that Israel's integration into the Arab and Islamic region would hamper every plan that seeks to uplift the nation.

Israel, which is backed by the US and its technology, aims to take advantage of the weakness of its adversaries in order to achieve a settlement, a plan which, in its essence, aims at linking the Arab economies to a new cluster with Israel at its center.

In resisting the occupation, Hamas directs its action against military targets and does its best to ensure that its resistance would not cause losses among civilians. It is true that in some cases resistance carried out by the movement resulted in some civilian losses, but these losses were in self-defense and came in retaliation to the massacres committed against innocent Palestinian civilians as was the case with the Ibrahimi Mosque massacre in Hebron when Palestinians were shot dead at the hands of
settlers and the soldiers of the occupation. Anxious to see no civilians on either side fall victim to the conflict, Hamas took several initiatives proposing that both sides stop targeting civilians and that they be excluded from the scope of conflict. However, the Zionists rejected these initiatives and by doing so they showed their terrorist nature and their indifference to saving innocent Palestinians from bloodshed.

In its activities of resistance, Hamas is keen on adhering to the noble teachings of Islam, human rights and international law. It carries out its lawful resistance not for the sake of murder and bloodshed as is the case with the Zionists.

Hamas has repeatedly affirmed it is not against the principle of peace. It is for it and is seeking to achieve it. It agrees with all countries that peace should prevail over the whole world. However, only just peace will restore to the Palestinians their rights and enable them to exercise their rights for independence and self-determination. The movement holds that the accords that have been concluded fall short of meeting the aspirations and minimum goals of the Palestinian people. These are unfair agreements which cause harm to our people. They reward the aggressors for their aggression and acknowledge to them the right to acquire what they have wrongfully taken from others. It is a situation where the conditions are dictated by the triumphant and the tyrannized are required to give up their rights. An unjust peace of the nature does not hold for long.

The very essence of any political settlement, irrespective of its origin or content, entails recognition of the Zionist enemy's right to exist on most parts of Palestine, which deprives millions of Palestinians the right to return, to determine their future and build their independent state on the whole of Palestinian land. This is indeed contradictory to human and international values and traditions, and is also forbidden under the Islamic jurisprudence. This should not be allowed to happen because the land of Palestine is a blessed Islamic land that has been usurped by the Zionists; and Jihad has become a duty for Muslims to restore it and expel their occupiers out of their land.

In view of the dangers posed by the settlement currently in process, the movement adopted a position based on the following points:

1. Promoting the awareness of the Palestinian people concerning the perils of the settlement and the accords resulting from it.
2. Working to group in one bloc all Palestinian forces opposed to the settlement and its accords and to promote their principles to the Palestinian, Arab and international arenas.
3. Urging the PLO leadership to withdraw from the negotiations with the Zionist entity and from the Gaza-Jericho deal which threatens the existence of our people in Palestine and the Diaspora now and in the future.
4. Making contacts with the Arab and Islamic countries with the intent to ask them to withdraw from the negotiations, not to respond to the conspiracy of normalizing the relations with the Zionist entity, and to lend us their support in confronting the Zionist enemy and its plans.

Hamas believes that the "Self-rule Authority" is an outcome of the agreements of the co-existence with the Zionist enemy. It holds that the Zionists have agreed to the establishment of this authority to achieve a number of short and long-term objectives.

The Authority, which is supported by 30,000 armed men forming a police force that holds different titles, is committed to implementing the obligations provided for in the agreements. At the top of these obligations is to confront resistance operations and to strike the resistance factions under the pretext of protecting the settlement process and the Authority's agreement with Israel.

Being hostage to the Oslo Agreements, the Authority serves as a legal cover for the occupation and its practices. Merely by the way of an example, when the Authority approved the opening of by-passes for the settlers, it gave the Zionist settlements a legal status.

Hamas maintains that the Zionists have avoided confronting the movement and its Jihadi program by hiding behind the Self-Rule Authority. The movement is also aware that if it entered into a military confrontation with the Self-Rule Authority, it would achieve one of the Zionist's greatest objectives and ambitions. Out of this awareness, Hamas did not allow itself to be dragged into a dispute with the Authority despite the Authority's repressive practices and its human rights violations in the Self-Rule areas, which included the assassination of Mujahideen, opening fire on citizens while praying, rounding up hundreds of Palestinians on the charges of supporting the resistance factions and torturing prisoners to death.

Hamas considers the Oslo Accords as an alluding formula for liquidating the Palestinian cause and for protecting the Zionists at the expense of the rights of the Palestinian people. It remains opposed to these accords and seeks to abort them by means of the popular resistance without resorting to violence against the Authority and its symbols.

1. liberation from Israeli occupation

2. construction of a democratic society

3. recognition that the Palestinian people are an integral part of the Arab Nation

4. recognition that the Palestinian struggle is part of the international, democratic struggle toward liberation, progress, democracy, and social justice

In light of the continuous Israeli occupation of Palestine, the PFLP believes that resistance to the occupation through any means is a legitimate right as understood by international convention.

The PFLP believes that the goals of the Palestinian people (the right to self-determination, the right to an independent and sovereign Palestinian state with Jerusalem as its capital, and the right of refugees to return), are to be understood as transitional measures on the way to establishing a democratic state in historic Palestine, where all peoples can live as equal citizens, entitled to basic human rights, regardless of race, religion, color, or sex. The PFLP works toward these goals through fostering cooperative efforts among Palestinians, the Arab Nation, and all international progressive forces.

The PFLP strives toward enhancing its international relations and alliances with states and organizations that work to foster social justice, freedom, and peace, as well as with those who stand in solidarity with the Palestinian cause. The PFLP believes that in order to create a world free of exploitation, oppression, and injustice, it is necessary to confront not only Zionism, but all imperialist aggressive policies.

a. self-determination for the Palestinian people

b. right of refugees to return

c. sovereign Palestinian state with Jerusalem as its capital

d. dismantling of Israeli settlements

2. construction of a democratic society, where all peoples can live as equal citizens, entitled to basic human rights, regardless of race, religion, color, or sex:

a. commitment to democratic values throughout all public arenas (political, social, and economic)

b. formulation of civil law

c. the recognition and safeguarding of women's rights

d. the recognition and safeguarding of children's rights

e. formulation of just election methods and legislation

f. separation of judicial, executive, and legislative authorities

g. enforcement of public respect for the law and the concept that all people are subject to the law

h. introduction of a more adequate national educational system based on the right of all to education

i. introduction of an adequate health care system accessible to all

j. the restructuring of agricultural production and general industry based on community needs

k. increased efforts to fight poverty

l. increased efforts to ensure freedom of speech and media

m. protection of organizations committed to building a civil society

n. redistribution of national income based on social justice standards, taking into consideration
marginalized sectors of society

o. introduction of a social welfare and social security system

p. formulation of a plan for economic development

3. recognition that the Palestinian people are an integral part of the Arab Nation

4. recognition that the Palestinian struggle is part of the international, democratic struggle toward liberation, progress, democracy, and social justice

Who are we?

The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) is a political party that is founded on a progressive vision of the common good. The PFLP's vision for creating a more just society, free from all forms of exploitation, is guided by the following:

a. Marxist interpretation and dialectical materialism in its understanding and analysis of social reality;
b. Progressive and democratic values in the culture, civilization, and heritage of the Palestinian people and the Arab Nation
c. Progressive and democratic values in world civilizations

The PFLP is a political party working toward regaining the legitimate national rights of the Palestinian people (the right to self-determination, the right to a sovereign Palestinian State with Jerusalem as its capital, the right of refugees to return). Regaining these rights is a first step in establishing a democratic state on the land of historic Palestine where all peoples can live as equal citizens, entitled to basic human rights, regardless of race, religion, color, or sex.

The PFLP is convinced that a democratic, pluralist, non-sexist society that guarantees the full protection of the rights of all people is the desired wish of the vast majority of the Palestinian people.

The PFLP believes that the major obstacle to peace in the Middle East is the Israeli occupation -- its ideology and its practices (political, economic, military-security) -- which are the means used to deny the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people.

Background

The roots of the PFLP go back to the Arab National Movement (ANM), a political movement established after the 1948 Palestinian nakbe (catastrophe). It was founded as a response to the defeat of the Arab regimes in the war with Israel which led to the loss of Palestine. The ANM, originally set up at the American University of Beirut in Lebanon, quickly spread throughout the Arab World. Dr. George Habash became the general secretary of the Movement.

Before the defeat of June 1967, there was a strong alliance between the ANM and Gamal Abdul-Nasser in Egypt. Similar views on the Arab revolution in general, and the liberation of Palestine in particular, as well as tactics used to achieve these goals, were held by both the ANM and Abdul-Nasser, though differences of opinion existed on less substantive issues. After the defeat of 1967, the ANM reached the conclusion that the program of Nasser had failed, due to its inability to realize any of the aims of the Arab revolution, namely, freedom, unity, socialism, and the liberation of Palestine. Contributing factors in this situation were the failure to unify Egypt and Syria, as well as the fact that local ANM groups in individual countries were preoccupied by their own national agendas.

This reality led to the desire on the part of the ANM to work toward constructing a new arena within which to address Arab national issues, with different leadership and a revised political program.

Consequently, in 1967, the Palestinian branch of the ANM established the PFLP. Dr. George Habash was elected its first general secretary and Abu Ali Mustafa, the deputy general secretary. Since that time, the PFLP has conducted six national conferences, the first in August 1967, and the last in July 2000.