The
Peace
Process
section
of
the
resource
book
will
outline
the
attempts
that
all
parties
involved
have
made
at
peace.
It
outlines
the
Oslo
process
and
several
summits,
reports,
and
peace
plans
there
after;
including
peace
plans
that
came
as
a
result
of
the
Al-Aqsa
Intifada.
An Arab Shepherd is Searching for His Goat on Mount Zion
LAST REMARKS BY LATE PRIME MINISTER RABIN AT TEL AVIV PEACE RALLY
Peula: The Peace Process Cup and Paper
By
Yehuda
Amichai
An
Arab
shepherd
is
searching
for
his
goat
on
Mount
Zion
and
on
the
opposite
mountain
I
am
searching
for
my
little
boy.
An
Arab
shepherd
and
a
Jewish
father
both
in
temporary
failure.
Our
voices
meet
above
the
Sultan’s
Pool
in
the
valley
between
us.
Neither
of
us
wants
the
child
or
the
goat
to
get
caught
in
the
wheels
of
the
terrible
Had
Gadya
machine.
Afterward
we
found
them
among
the
bushes
and
our
voices
came
back
inside
us,
laughing
and
crying.
Searching
for
a
goat
or
a
son
has
always
been
the
beginning
of
a
new
religion
in
these
mountains
Taken
from
a
collection
of
Yehuda
Amichai’s
work
entitled,
Poems
of
Jerusalem
and
Love
Poems.
Following
election
of
the
Rabin
Government
in
1992
in
Israel,
Israelis
and
Palestinians
began
secret
negotiations
outside
the
framework
of
the
Madrid
conference
negotiations
being
held
in
Washington
DC,
which
were
leading
nowhere.
The
Israeli
government
had
earlier
refused
to
negotiate
with
the
Palestine
Liberation
Organization
(PLO),
but
they
found
that
no
progress
could
be
made
in
Washington,
because
the
supposedly
independent
Palestinian
delegates
had
to
refer
every
issue
back
to
the
PNA,
and
so
it
was
decided
to
pursue
a
separate
channel
in
secret,
under
the
sponsorship
of
Norwegian
mediators.
In
1993,
The
Oslo Declaration
of
Principles
was
the
result
of
these
negotiations,
surprising
the
United
States
and
the
world,
and
paving
the
way
for
the
Middle
East
Peace
process.
In
this
document,
both
sides
recognized
the
rights
of
the
other to
exist
as
a
people
within
the
borders
of
Palestine/Israel,
and
committed
themselves
to
negotiating
a
permanent
settlement
and
to
improving
relations
between
the
two
peoples.
The
agreement
provides
a
framework
for
a
solution,
rather
than
a
solution.
It
made
possible
a
peace
treaty
with
Jordan.
The
chief
negotiators
on
both
sides
subsequently
received
the
Nobel
Peace
Prize.
The
world
was
treated
to
the
unlikely
spectacle
of
Yasser
Arafat
and
Yizhak
Rabin
shaking
hands,
and
of
Palestinians
and
Israelis
talking
of
peace
for
the
first
time
in
a
hundred
years.
This
first
agreement
also
provided
that
Israeli
forces
would
withdraw
from
unspecified
areas
in
the
Gaza
Strip
and
a
small
area
around
Jericho,
in
preparation
for
elections
to
be
held
for
a
Palestinian
government.
The
next
agreement
was
signed
in
1995.
The
purpose
of
the
Oslo
interim
agreement
was
to
create
a
situation
that
would
make
it
possible
for
the
Palestinians
to
negotiate
as
an
independent
party,
without
determining
in
itself
the
final
status.
The
agreement
called
for
redeployment
of
the
Israeli
Army
from
a
sufficient
part
of
the
West
Bank
and
Gaza
Strip
to
allow
free
elections
to
take
place.
That
is,
the
army
withdrew
from
most
population
centers,
including
about
97%
of
the
population,
but
only
about
7%
of
the
area
(map
on
following
page).
The
elections
allowed
the
Palestinians
to
set
up
the
Palestine
National
Authority
as
a
negotiating
partner
representing
the
Palestinians,
and
as
an
administrative
authority
over
the
Palestinians.
Taken
from
MidEast
Web
(http://www.mideastweb.org/history.htm)
Questions:
·
What
do
you
think
finally
brought
Israel
and
the
PA
to
negotiate
with
one
another?
Do
you
think
that
this
agreement
is
fair
to
both
parties?
In
the
summer
of
1998,
both
the
Israelis
and
the
Palestinians
had
failed
to
comply
with
agreements
made
in
the
Oslo
accords.
The
Palestinians
had
failed
to
sufficiently
police
terrorism
and
the
Israelis
had
not
sufficiently
pulled
out
of
the
territories
they
occupied.
This
led
to
a
meeting
at
the
Wye
River
plantation
in
Maryland,
with
United
States
President
Bill
Clinton
overseeing.
Israel
agreed
to
carry
out
a
staged
withdrawal
from
some
13%
of
the
territory
it
occupied,
and
the
Palestinian
National
Authority
undertook
to
suppress
terror
and
eliminate
both
the
private
arsenals
and
weapons
stockpiled
by
the
PA
in
violation
of
the
accords.
The
PA
also
agreed
to
take
steps
against
incitement
and
the
most
virulent
anti-Israel
propaganda.
The
implementation
of
the
agreement
quickly
failed.
Israel
withdrew
from
some,
but
not
all,
of
the
agreed
upon
occupied
territories,
and
the
PA
began
cracking
down
on
militants
in
the
territories.
The
PA,
however,
failed
to
implement
the
arms
reduction
clause
among
other
parts
of
the
agreement.
As
a
result,
Israel
did
not
continue
with
their
withdrawal
from
the
agreed
upon
areas.
Article
IV
of
this
agreement
stated:
“The
two
sides
will
immediately
resume
permanent
status
negotiations
on
an
accelerated
basis
and
will
make
a
determined
effort
to
achieve
the
mutual
goal
of
reaching
an
agreement
by
May
4,
1999.”
Questions:
·
Do
you
believe
that
there
was
a
true
effort
to
reach
a
final
agreement
by
this
date?
·
Do
you
believe
that
this
attempt
at
a
just
peace
was
a
“determined
effort”
on
the
part
of
either
party?
November
4,
1995
Permit
me
to
say
that
I
am
deeply
moved.
I
wish
to
thank
each
and
every
one
of
you,
who
have
come
here
today
to
take
a
stand
against
violence
and
for
peace.
This
government,
which
I
am
privileged
to
head,
together
with
my
friend
Shimon
Peres,
decided
to
give
peace
a
chance
--
a
peace
that
will
solve
most
of
Israel's
problems.
I
was
a
military
man
for
27
years.
I
fought
so
long
as
there
was
no
chance
for
peace.
I
believe
that
there
is
now
a
chance
for
peace,
a
great
chance.
We
must
take
advantage
of
it
for
the
sake
of
those
standing
here,
and
for
those
who
are
not
here
--
and
they
are
many.
I
have
always
believed
that
the
majority
of
the
people
want
peace
and
are
ready
to
take
risks
for
peace.
In
coming
here
today,
you
demonstrate,
together
with
many
others
who
did
not
come,
that
the
people
truly
desire
peace
and
oppose
violence.
Violence
erodes
the
basis
of
Israeli
democracy.
It
must
be
condemned
and
isolated.
This
is
not
the
way
of
the
State
of
Israel.
In
a
democracy
there
can
be
differences,
but
the
final
decision
will
be
taken
in
democratic
elections,
as
the
1992
elections
which
gave
us
the
mandate
to
do
what
we
are
doing,
and
to
continue
on
this
course.
I
want
to
say
that
I
am
proud
of
the
fact
that
representatives
of
the
countries
with
whom
we
are
living
in
peace
are
present
with
us
here,
and
will
continue
to
be
here:
Egypt,
Jordan,
and
Morocco,
which
opened
the
road
to
peace
for
us.
I
want
to
thank
the
President
of
Egypt,
the
King
of
Jordan,
and
the
King
of
Morocco,
represented
here
today,
for
their
partnership
with
us
in
our
march
towards
peace.
But,
more
than
anything,
in
the
more
than
three
years
of
this
Government's
existence,
the
Israeli
people
has
proven
that
it
is
possible
to
make
peace,
that
peace
opens
the
door
to
a
better
economy
and
society;
that
peace
is
not
just
a
prayer.
Peace
is
first
of
all
in
our
prayers,
but
it
is
also
the
aspiration
of
the
Jewish
people,
a
genuine
aspiration
for
peace.
There
are
enemies
of
peace
who
are
trying
to
hurt
us,
in
order
to
torpedo
the
peace
process.
I
want
to
say
bluntly,
that
we
have
found
a
partner
for
peace
among
the
Palestinians
as
well:
the
PLO,
which
was
an
enemy,
and
has
ceased
to
engage
in
terrorism.
Without
partners
for
peace,
there
can
be
no
peace.
We
will
demand
that
they
do
their
part
for
peace,
just
as
we
will
do
our
part
for
peace,
in
order
to
solve
the
most
complicated,
prolonged,
and
emotionally
charged
aspect
of
the
Israeli-Arab
conflict:
the
Palestinian-Israeli
conflict.
This
is
a
course
which
is
fraught
with
difficulties
and
pain.
For
Israel,
there
is
no
path
that
is
without
pain.
But
the
path
of
peace
is
preferable
to
the
path
of
war.
I
say
this
to
you
as
one
who
was
a
military
man,
someone
who
is
today
Minister
of
Defense
and
sees
the
pain
of
the
families
of
the
IDF
soldiers.
For
them,
for
our
children,
in
my
case
for
our
grandchildren,
I
want
this
Government
to
exhaust
every
opening,
every
possibility,
to
promote
and
achieve
a
comprehensive
peace.
Even
with
Syria,
is
will
be
possible
to
make
peace.
This
rally
must
send
a
message
to
the
Israeli
people,
to
the
Jewish
people
around
the
world,
to
the
many
people
in
the
Arab
world,
and
indeed
to
the
entire
world,
that
the
Israeli
people
want
peace,
support
peace.
For
this,
I
thank
you.
Questions:
·
Why
was
Prime
Minister
Yitzhak
Rabin
assassinated
upon
finishing
this
speech?
·
Why
was
he
assassinated
by
an
Israeli?
·
How
does
it
make
you
feel?
Peula:
The
Peace
Process
Cup
and
Paper
Age:
Ages
10
to
14,
for
one
to
two
hours,
depending
on
how
you
want
to
run
the
method
and
the
sicha.
Materials:
Masking
tape
outline
of
Israel
and
occupied
territories
on
floor
of
room.
Paper
cups
(lots
and
lots),
Wadded-up
balls
of
paper
(I
suggest
getting
the
paper
from
public
paper
recycling
boxes),
Signs
listing
the
various
“actors”
in
the
conflict,
with
tape
or
pins
so
that
their
representatives
can
wear
them,
Scroll
of
paper
(for
peace
agreement),
and
nice
marker/pen
to
do
the
writing
Method:
Divide
the
chanichim
into
two
groups,
70%
in
the
Israeli
group
and
30%
in
the
Palestinian
group.
Have
them
sit
in
their
proper
locations
(let
the
Palestinians
decide
whether
they
all
want
to
be
in
area
or
if
they
should
spread
out
between
the
two
territories
--
it
doesn’t
really
matter
much
for
the
point
of
the
peulah
as
long
as
they’re
not
outside
of
the
territories).
1.
Give
each
of
the
groups
a
pile
of
paper
cups
(give
the
Israelis
significantly
more
cups).
The
cups
represent
resources
for
building
a
new
society
(but
don’t
tell
the
kids
that).
Tell
the
two
groups
that
they
are
each
trying
to
build
the
biggest
tower
of
cups
that
they
can.
If
they’ve
been
in
HDNA
for
a
while,
they
may
get
catty
and
claim
that
they
know
that
they’re
“supposed
to”
combine
their
cups
into
one
big
tower,
but
you
should
try
to
discourage
this.
2.
After
they’ve
been
working
for
a
bit,
and
have
started
to
realize
that
their
cup
amounts
aren’t
equal
to
begin
with,
send
in
the
“actors”.
Their
signs
should
read
things
like:
a)
Diaspora
Jewry,
b)
Other
Arab
nations,
c)
U.S.
government,
d)
United
Nations.
Each
of
these
actors
should
give
their
appropriate
groups
cups
or
wadded
up
paper
balls.
If
the
kids
question
why
they’re
being
given
paper
balls,
tell
them
that
they
may
eventually
have
to
defend
themselves
(obviously
the
balls
are
weapons)
but
don’t
suggest
that
they
attack
--
let
them
figure
that
out
themselves.
Diaspora
should
give
both,
Arab
nations
should
give
mainly
balls
but
also
a
few
cups,
the
U.S.
government
should
give
the
Israelis
a
lot
of
both,
and
give
the
Palestinians
maybe
one
or
two
cups.
The
U.N.
should
just
come
in
and
try
to
count
their
cups
and
periodically
take
away
their
paper
balls
and
scold
them
for
having
them.
3.
Let
the
paper
ball
fight
get
hectic.
Then
stop
it
and
ask
if
this
is
how
they
want
to
live.
Hopefully
the
answer
will
be
no.
If
not,
convince
them.
4.
Have
a
short
sicha
about
what
would
make
this
better.
Then
have
the
chanichim
write
out
a
peace
deal.
It
should
talk
about
resources,
security,
borders,
exchange,
etc.
Don’t
just
push
them
to
share
everything.
That’s
not
realistic.
If
they
seem
to
be
going
in
that
way,
remind
them
that
they’re
Israelis
and
Palestinians
and
have
different
group
interests
that
are
based
in
religion/culture/history.
5.
As
they
finish
writing
up
their
deal,
the
U.S.
representative
should
come
in
and
congratulate
them.
He/She
should
then
arrange
a
peace
deal
signing
ceremony,
at
which
it
looks
like
he/she
brokered
the
whole
thing.
Recreate
the
handshake,
take
pictures,
etc.
Sikkum:
1.
Was
this
a
good
deal
that
you’ve
worked
out?
Why
or
why
not?
2.
Was
this
a
realistic
depiction
of
what’s
going
on
in
Israel/Palestine?
Why
or
not?
3.
What
is
the
real
situation
like?
What
are
the
major
elements
of
concern?
4.
What
does
a
peace
deal
have
to
include
to
succeed?
Continue
to
ask
questions
on
a
similar
vein.
Don’t
feel
that
you
have
to
get
too
technical,
especially
with
younger
chanichim.
Goal:
To
have
fun
while
learning
about
the
positions
of
the
Palestinians
and
Israelis
as
they
head
into
final
status
talks.
Age:
All
ages.
Method:
Six
groups
of
chairs
are
set
up.
Music
is
played
(like
musical
chairs).
People
dance
around
and
when
the
music
stops
everyone
finds
a
seat.
There
is
a
limited
amount
of
seats
at
each
station.
When
the
seats
are
filled
up,
the
left
overs
go
onto
the
stage
-
the
hot
seat.
The
hot
seat
gets
to
choose
out
of
two
hats-
one
with
the
about
eight
facts
all
cut
up
separately
and
the
other
with
eight
television
shows.
They
get
a
combination
and
they
must
prepare
a
skit
for
the
rest.
Meanwhile
the
rest
are
doing
little
activities
at
their
stations
centered
around
the
facts.
Every
five
minutes
the
hot
seat
presents,
then
the
music
comes
back
on
and
the
process
starts
again.
The
stations
are:
Station
1:
Word
scramble.
The
facts
are
written
on
separate
pieces
of
paper,
but
the
words
in
each
sentence
are
jumbled.
They
must
de-scramble
the
sentence
and
then
discuss
if
time
allows.
Station
2:
Win
Lose
or
Draw
with
the
facts.
Station
3:
Tic
Tac
Toe.
You
get
to
place
your
X
or
O
if
you
answer
the
trivia
question
right.
Questions:
1.
What
parts
of
Israel
do
the
Israelis
consider
non-negotiable?
2.
Is
Jerusalem
east
or
west
of
the
Jordan
River?
3.
What
were
the
first
cities
given
back
to
the
Palestinians?
4.
What
did
Israel
return
to
Egypt
in
1979?
5.
What
do
the
Palestinians
want
to
happen
to
the
refugees?
6.
Where
do
the
Palestinians
want
their
capital
to
be?
7.
When
was
Oslo
signed?
8.
Would
Israel
accept
the
Palestinian
in
the
West
Bank?
9.
Do
most
Palestinians
feel
that
the
prisoner
release
by
Israel
in
summer
1999
is
enough?
Station
4:
They
must
fill
out
this
Mad
Lib:
The
_______
(a
people)
position
is
that
_______
(place)
will
never
be
divided.
Israel
wants
many
_______
(place)
to
remain
as
blocks
in
________
(adjective)
________
(place).
________
(place)
will
never
_______
(verb)
to
pre-
____
(date)
borders
and
will
never
_______
(verb)
a
_______
(adjective)
army
_______
(direction)
of
_______
(natural
landmark).
On
the
other
hand,
Palestinians
________
(verb)
to
be
able
to
________
(verb)
their
capital
in
________
(place)
and
want
all
of
the
_______
(place)
and
_______
(place).
The
_______
(a
people)
want
all
_______
(adjective)
_______
(a
people)
to
be
_______
(verb)
and
the
right
to
_______
(verb)
to
their
homeland.
How
can
_______
(noun)
be
_______
(verb)?
Station
5:
One
of
these
things
is
not
like
the
other,
one
of
these
things
does
not
belong.
(song
from
Sesame
Street,
get
it
dummy
?)
There
are
two
maps
of
Israel
with
differences:
1.
One
has
territories,
other
has
them
as
a
separate
state.
2.
One
has
Palestinians
behind
bars,
one
has
them
freed.
3.
One
has
Palestinians
settled
in
Jordan,
other
has
them
in
West
Bank.
4.
One
has
Jerusalem
as
the
only
capital,
other
has
Jerusalem
and
Al
Quds.
5.
One
has
El
Al
flying
in
and
the
other
has
Palestinian
air
line.
6.
One
has
Israeli
flag
in
Gaza,
other
has
Palestinian
flag.
7.
Other
cute
little
differences.
Sikkum:
All
station
leaders
come
the
front
and
ask
the
kids
to
name
the
eight
facts
by
asking
for
the
Israeli
pillars
and
then
the
Palestinian
demands,
one
by
one.
The
Facts:
Israel’s
Four
Red
Pillars
1.
Jerusalem
will
never
be
divided.
2.
Many
settlements
will
remain
as
blocks
of
Israeli
territory
inside
the
occupied
territories.
3.
There
will
never
be
a
foreign
army
west
of
the
Jordan
River.
4.
Israel
will
never
return
to
the
pre-1967
borders.
Palestinian
Requirements
for
Final
Status
1.
Be
able
to
establish
their
capital
in
Jerusalem.
2.
Retaining
all
of
the
West
Bank
and
Gaza.
3.
Palestinians
must
have
a
right
of
return
to
their
homeland.
4.
Release
of
all
political
prisoners.
As the agreement made at the Wye plantation failed, and the deadline of May 4, 1999 had not been reached, the two parties returned to the negotiating table. In July 2000, American, Israeli and Palestinian leaders met at Camp David Maryland in an attempt to work out a compromise that would serve as the framework peace agreement for a final status agreement. Both sides had agreed to set September as a deadline for conclusion of the final status talks, so time was pressing. After many days of intensive negotiations, the summit failed and both Middle Eastern leaders returned home. The content of the talks has remained secret from the public, but there have been many rumors that Prime Minister Ehud Barak had offered Arafat the most generous peace offer to date. All that is known for sure is that the talks concerned Jerusalem, refugees, and final status of Palestinian statehood. There have been speculations, however, as to how much was actually offered at Camp David. Gush Shalom, a leftist Israeli peace organization, has outlined the information that has been leaked to the public concerning this offer. Click here to see the maps. . .
Questions:
·
Why
do
you
think
the
Palestinians
did
not
accept
this
offer?
After
the
outbreak
of
the
Al-Aqsa
Intifada,
President
Bill
Clinton
delivered
a
speech
to
the
Israel
Policy
Forum
in
New
York
that
outlined
what
have
come
to
be
known
as
the
Clinton
Parameters.
There
were
five
parameters
put
forth
by
Clinton
that
would
give
end
to
the
current
violence
and
serve
as
a
final
resolution
to
the
long-lasting
conflict.
The
parameters,
in
short,
were:
1.)
The
creation
of
a
sovereign
Palestinian
state
that
would
include
most
of
the
West
Bank
and
all
of
Gaza.
Settlement
blocks
would
become
a
part
of
Israel.
2.)
Compensation
for
the
Palestinian
refugees.
This
would
include
a
right
for
them
to
live
in
the
aforementioned
Palestinian
state,
a
right
to
find
new
homes
in
their
current
locations
or
other
countries
including
Israel.
The
refugees
would
additionally
receive
compensation
and
assistance
in
building
new
lives
from
the
international
community.
3.)
Ensured
security
for
Israel.
There
would
be
an
international
presence
in
Palestine,
a
phased
Israeli
military
withdrawal,
and
Palestine
would
be
non-militarized.
4.)
Jerusalem
as
an
open
and
undived
city,
which
would
serve
as
the
capital
of
both
states.
Jewish
sectors
would
be
Israeli
and
Arab
sectors
would
be
Palestinian.
5.) The violence from both sides would have to end immediately.
In
January
of
2001,
after
the
outbreak
of
the
Al-Aqsa
Intifada,
Barak
and
Arafat
returned
to
the
negotiation
table
in
Taba,
on
the
Israeli-Egyptian
border.
The
meeting
was
facilitated
by
Egyptian
President,
Hosni
Mubarak
and
focused
largely
on
the
issue
of
Palestinian
refugees.
Although
there
was
again
no
public
summary
of
the
meeting,
information
has
leaked
out
as
to
what
certain
agreements
entailed.
For
instance,
Israeli
sources
have
conceded
that
the
Palestinians
agreed
to
a
map
wherein
Israel
would
keep
most
of
the
settlements
and
around
4%
of
the
territory.
Below
is
a
joint
statement
that
was
released
among
the
completion
of
the
talks
in
he
Jerusalem
Post
on
January
28,
2001.
"The
Israeli
and
Palestinian
delegations
conducted
during
the
last
six
days
serious,
deep
and
practical
talks
with
the
aim
of
reaching
a
permanent
and
stable
agreement
between
the
two
parties.
"The
Taba
talks
were
unprecedented
in
their
positive
atmosphere
and
expression
of
mutual
willingness
to
meet
the
national,
security
and
existential
needs
of
each
side.
"Given
the
circumstances
and
time
constraints,
it
proved
impossible
to
reach
understandings
on
all
issues,
despite
the
substantial
progress
that
was
achieved
in
each
of
the
issues
discussed.
"The
sides
declare
that
they
have
never
been
closer
to
reaching
an
agreement
and
it
is
thus
our
shared
belief
that
the
remaining
gaps
could
be
bridged
with
the
resumption
of
negotiations
following
the
Israeli
elections.
"The
two
sides
take
upon
themselves
to
return
to
normalcy
and
to
establish
[a]
security
situation
on
the
ground
through
the
observation
of
their
mutual
commitments
in
the
spirit
of
the
Sharm
e-Sheikh
memorandum.
"The
negotiation
teams
discussed
four
main
themes:
refugees,
security,
borders
and
Jerusalem,
with
a
goal
to
reach
a
permanent
agreement
that
will
bring
an
end
to
the
conflict
between
them
and
provide
peace
to
both
people.
"The
two
sides
took
into
account
the
ideas
suggested
by
President
Clinton
together
with
their
respective
qualifications
and
reservations.
"On
all
these
issues
there
was
substantial
progress
in
the
understanding
of
the
other
side's
positions
and
in
some
of
them
the
two
sides
grew
closer.
"As
stated
above,
the
political
timetable
prevented
reaching
an
agreement
on
all
the
issues.
"However,
in
light
of
the
significant
progress
in
narrowing
the
differences
between
the
sides,
the
two
sides
are
convinced
that
in
a
short
period
of
time
and
given
an
intensive
effort
and
the
acknowledgment
of
the
essential
and
urgent
nature
of
reaching
an
agreement,
it
will
be
possible
to
bridge
the
differences
remaining
and
attain
a
permanent
settlement
of
peace
between
them.
"In
this
respect,
the
two
sides
are
confident
that
they
can
begin
and
move
forward
in
this
process
at
the
earliest
practical
opportunity.
"The
Taba
talks
conclude
an
extensive
phase
in
the
Israeli-Palestinian
permanent
status
negotiations
with
a
sense
of
having
succeeded
in
rebuilding
trust
between
the
sides
and
with
the
notion
that
they
were
never
closer
in
reaching
an
agreement
between
them
than
today.
"We
leave
Taba
in
a
spirit
of
hope
and
mutual
achievement,
acknowledging
that
the
foundations
have
been
laid
both
in
reestablishing
mutual
confidence
and
in
having
progressed
in
a
substantive
engagement
on
all
core
issues.
"The
two
sides
express
their
gratitude
to
President
Hosni
Mubarak
for
hosting
and
facilitating
these
talks.
"They
also
express
their
thanks
to
the
European
Union
for
its
role
in
supporting
the
talks."
After
the
violence
erupted
in
Israel
and
the
occupied
territories,
President
Clinton
convened
a
summit
meeting
in
Sharm
El
Sheikh
in
efforts
to
curb
the
violence.
The
Palestinians
insisted
that
a
commission
come
to
investigate
the
causes
of
the
violence
and
to
make
recommendations.
U.S.
Senator
George
Mitchell
headed
this
commission.
In
April
2001,
the
report
from
the
Mitchell
Commission
was
released.
The
report,
not
in
any
attempt
to
place
blame
on
either
party,
focused
primarily
on
the
settlement
activity
in
the
West
Bank.
The
main
recommendation
was
to
freeze
all
settlement
activity
in
the
West
Bank.
Other
recommendations
included
a
return
to
the
negotiating
table,
confidence
building
measures,
a
cessation
of
violence,
and
security
cooperation.
A
segment
of
the
text
of
the
Mitchell
Report
is
below
and
a
summary
can
be
found
in
the
Al-Aqsa
Intifada
section
of
the
resource
book.
“…It
is
clear
from
their
statements
that
the
participants
in
the
summit
of
last
October
hoped
and
intended
that
the
outbreak
of
violence,
then
less
than
a
month
old,
would
soon
end.
The
U.S.
President's
letters
to
us,
asking
that
we
make
recommendations
on
how
to
prevent
a
recurrence
of
violence,
reflect
that
intention.
Yet
the
violence
has
not
ended.
It
has
worsened.
Thus
the
overriding
concern
of
those
in
the
region
with
whom
we
spoke
is
to
end
the
violence
and
to
return
to
the
process
of
shaping
a
sustainable
peace.
That
is
what
we
were
told,
and
were
asked
to
address,
by
Israelis
and
Palestinians
alike.
It
was
the
message
conveyed
to
us
as
well
by
President
Mubarak
of
Egypt,
King
Abdullah
of
Jordan,
and
UN
Secretary
General
Annan.
Their
concern
must
be
ours.
If
our
report
is
to
have
effect,
it
must
deal
with
the
situation
that
exists,
which
is
different
from
that
envisaged
by
the
summit
participants.
In
this
report,
we
will
try
to
answer
the
questions
assigned
to
us
by
the
Sharm
el-Sheikh
summit:
What
happened?
Why
did
it
happen?
In
light
of
the
current
situation,
however,
we
must
elaborate
on
the
third
part
of
our
mandate:
How
can
the
recurrence
of
violence
be
prevented?
The
relevance
and
impact
of
our
work,
in
the
end,
will
be
measured
by
the
recommendations
we
make
concerning
the
following:
·
·
Resuming
Negotiations…”
In
March
of
2002,
Saudi
Crown
Prince
Abdullah
presented
a
peace
plan
to
the
Arab
League
summit
conference
in
Beirut.
The
plan
essentially
presented
the
idea
of
the
Arab
states
normalizing
relations
with
Israel.
Israel
would
have
to
withdraw
from
all
territories
occupied
since
1967
and
allow
for
a
return
of
Palestinian
refugees.
Neither
Israel
nor
the
PA
agreed
to
the
proposal
and
Egypt
and
Jordan
did
not
attend
the
conference.
Full
text
of
the
proposal
is
below.
The
Council
of
Arab
States
at
the
Summit
Level
at
its
14th
Ordinary
Session,
reaffirming
the
resolution
taken
in
June
1996
at
the
Cairo
Extra-Ordinary
Arab
Summit
that
a
just
and
comprehensive
peace
in
the
Middle
East
is
the
strategic
option
of
the
Arab
countries,
to
be
achieved
in
accordance
with
international
legality,
and
which
would
require
a
comparable
commitment
on
the
part
of
the
Israeli
government.
Having
listened
to
the
statement
made
by
his
royal
highness
Prince
Abdullah
bin
Abdul
Aziz,
crown
prince
of
the
Kingdom
of
Saudi
Arabia,
in
which
his
highness
presented
his
initiative
calling
for
full
Israeli
withdrawal
from
all
the
Arab
territories
occupied
since
June
1967,
in
implementation
of
Security
Council
Resolutions
242
and
338,
reaffirmed
by
the
Madrid
Conference
of
1991
and
the
land-for-peace
principle,
and
Israel's
acceptance
of
an
independent
Palestinian
state
with
East
Jerusalem
as
its
capital,
in
return
for
the
establishment
of
normal
relations
in
the
context
of
a
comprehensive
peace
with
Israel.
Emanating
from
the
conviction
of
the
Arab
countries
that
a
military
solution
to
the
conflict
will
not
achieve
peace
or
provide
security
for
the
parties,
the
council:
1.
Requests
Israel
to
reconsider
its
policies
and
declare
that
a
just
peace
is
its
strategic
option
as
well.
2.
Further
calls
upon
Israel
to
affirm:
I-
Full
Israeli
withdrawal
from
all
the
territories
occupied
since
1967,
including
the
Syrian
Golan
Heights,
to
the
June
4,
1967
lines
as
well
as
the
remaining
occupied
Lebanese
territories
in
the
south
of
Lebanon.
II-
Achievement
of
a
just
solution
to
the
Palestinian
refugee
problem
to
be
agreed
upon
in
accordance
with
UN
General
Assembly
Resolution
194.
III-
The
acceptance
of
the
establishment
of
a
sovereign
independent
Palestinian
state
on
the
Palestinian
territories
occupied
since
June
4,
1967
in
the
West
Bank
and
Gaza
Strip,
with
East
Jerusalem
as
its
capital.
3.
Consequently,
the
Arab
countries
affirm
the
following:
I-
Consider
the
Arab-Israeli
conflict
ended,
and
enter
into
a
peace
agreement
with
Israel,
and
provide
security
for
all
the
states
of
the
region
II-
Establish
normal
relations
with
Israel
in
the
context
of
this
comprehensive
peace.
4.
Assures
the
rejection
of
all
forms
of
Palestinian
patriation
which
conflict
with
the
special
circumstances
of
the
Arab
host
countries
5.
Calls
upon
the
government
of
Israel
and
all
Israelis
to
accept
this
initiative
in
order
to
safeguard
the
prospects
for
peace
and
stop
the
further
shedding
of
blood,
enabling
the
Arab
countries
and
Israel
to
live
in
peace
and
good
neighborliness
and
provide
future
generations
with
security,
stability
and
prosperity
6.
Invites
the
international
community
and
all
countries
and
organizations
to
support
this
initiative.
7.
Requests
the
chairman
of
the
summit
to
form
a
special
committee
composed
of
some
of
its
concerned
member
states
and
the
secretary
general
of
the
League
of
Arab
States
to
pursue
the
necessary
contacts
to
gain
support
for
this
initiative
at
all
levels,
particularly
from
the
United
Nations,
the
Security
Council,
the
United
States
of
America,
the
Russian
Federation,
the
Muslim
states
and
the
European
Union.
Questions:
·
What
do
the
peace
plans
created
since
the
start
of
Al-Aqsa
Intifada
have
in
common?
·
Which
plan
do
you
think
is
the
most
viable
option?